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ABSTRACT Research supporting the Matthew effect demonstrates that high-status actors experience 
performance benefits due to increased recognition of  their work and greater opportunities and 
resources, but recent research also indicates that high-status actors face a greater risk of  negative 
performance evaluations. In this paper, we seek to contribute to the status literature by reconciling 
these findings and ask: To what extent does status influence heterogeneity in performance evalu-
ations? We explore how project leader status affects the performance of  innovation projects in 
the video game industry. We hypothesize that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
project leader status and project performance, and a positive relationship between project leader 
status and performance extremeness (i.e., performance variation). In order to test our hypotheses, 
we analysed the performance of  video game projects and computed the status of  project leaders 
by applying a project affiliation social network analysis. We find that an intermediate level of  status 
– neither too much nor too little – is positively associated with average project performance. We 
also reveal more extreme performance effects for high-status leaders: While some achieve superior 
project performance, others experience significant project failures. We, therefore, provide important 
theoretical and practical insights regarding how status affects the implementation of  innovations. 
We also discuss the implications of  these findings for the literature on middle-status conformity.
Keywords: innovation, project performance, social network analysis, status
INTRODUCTION
Ever since Merton coined the term ‘Matthew effect’ in 1968, there has been growing 
evidence that status has positive effects on performance (see Podolny, 2005; Sauder et al., 
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2012, for extensive reviews). The Matthew effect refers to the ‘rich get richer’ principle: 
Those who have high status are in a position to gain even more (Azoulay et al., 2014; 
Kim and King, 2014; Merton, 1968). What drives the Matthew effect is that the work 
of  high-status actors gets more attention and is valued more highly than similar work by 
low-status actors. Status functions as an indicator of  past unobserved quality and raises 
performance expectations. People expect high-status actors to be able to continue to pro-
duce high-quality work. Such expectations can be beneficial to high-status individuals, 
inasmuch as it gives them more opportunities and resources for future projects.
Recent research, however, has shown that status is not always beneficial and may some-
times lead to negative performance consequences (King and Carberry, 2018). Inasmuch 
as status increases attention to and scrutiny of  actors, high-status actors may be unable 
to always satisfy their audiences (King and McDonnell, 2015; Kovács and Sharkey, 2014; 
McDonnell and King, 2018; Rhee and Haunschild, 2006). How do we reconcile these 
contrasting patterns of  the effect of  status on performance? To what extent does status 
influence heterogeneity in performance?
We seek to reconcile these conflicting findings by examining how status affects perfor-
mance in a context in which high-status producers face not only greater opportunities 
and resources but also a greater workload due to the exceeding expectations placed on 
them in the workplace. High-status actors benefit from increased access to opportunities 
and resources (à la the Matthew effect) but they also may experience cognitive overload 
due to the exceedingly high expectations placed on them by others in the workplace, 
which results in an inverted U-shaped status-project performance relationship. We argue 
that due to these exceeding expectations, high-status actors’ projects will also face ex-
treme performance.
To empirically assess the consequences of  status on performance, we investigate how 
a leader’s status affects project performance in the video game industry where produc-
ers take on the role of  project leaders (Irish, 2005; Mollick, 2012). Arguably, the status 
of  video game project leaders in an organization is known to key decision-makers in 
that organization and they will determine which projects are selected and implemented 
(Reitzig and Sorenson, 2013). Therefore, in order to launch a product, project leaders 
first have to convince decision-makers in the organization. Status can be instrumental in 
this process. In the best case scenario, their individual status can help project leaders to 
get their project accepted, and the resulting products are evaluated positively by an ex-
ternal audience. In the worst case, however, it can also mean that products are put on to 
the market that have been evaluated positively internally but turn out to perform poorly 
once exposed to the external audience.
Thus, when status influences project selection decisions, it may have both positive and 
negative consequences on the ultimate project performance as evaluated by an external 
audience. To investigate how status affects project performance and variation in project 
performance, we conducted a social network analysis of  project leaders managing inno-
vative product development projects in the video game industry. Through this analysis 
we determined the status position of  a project leader within their organization’s internal 
status hierarchy by looking at their relative centrality compared to other organizational 
members (Grigoriou and Rothaermel, 2014). The video game industry is an appropriate 
setting in which to test our theory, since it is dynamic and uncertain (Venkatraman and 
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Lee, 2004), and informal quality indicators such as status should thus have a decisive 
effect on internal organizational decision-making (Reitzig and Sorenson, 2013). To illus-
trate and contextualize our theoretical arguments, we also use quotes from interviews we 
conducted with experts in the video game industry.
Our findings help to show how status affects project performance and which proj-
ect leaders can conform to those expectations that come from their status. To support 
our theory, we provide evidence to show that the highest average project performance 
is achieved when the project leader has an intermediate level of  status. In addition, 
we show that very high status is a contributory factor in extreme project performance 
(Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007; Sanders and Hambrick, 2007). This second finding 
implies that, on the one hand, high-status project leaders are associated with projects 
that are evaluated very positively by external audiences and thus perform very well on 
the market. On the other hand, they also appear to be associated with projects that fall 
below the expected performance, that is, where performance is much lower than would 
normally be expected from a leader of  such high status. Interestingly, while middle-status 
conformity would predict that both low- and high-status actors should exhibit extreme 
performance (Phillips and Zuckerman, 2001), we show that, among project leaders, only 
those with high status are given scope to do so.
It is crucial to increase our understanding of  the factors that lead not only to great proj-
ect successes but also to major project failures. Initial acceptance and going ahead with 
low-quality projects is a serious issue for organizations, since product-related decision- 
making is subject to decision traps, which may then lead to notable project failures (Van 
Oorschot et al., 2013). A single failure, however, may be enough to put the organization 
itself  in danger (see, for instance, Thompson (2009) and Yin-Poole (2019) for two notable 
examples from the video game industry). Consider the example of  George Brussard, 
one of  the most renowned and admired video game producers in the industry in the 
’90s. After many successful titles, he started to develop Duke Nukem Forever, a project 
for which there were great expectations. However, his co-workers recognized too late 
that things were going wrong. After 12 years of  development and estimated expenditure 
of  at least $20 million, his previously successful company, 3D Realms, went bankrupt 
(Thompson, 2009). Our findings help to provide a better understanding of  why project 
performance may vary so much when projects are led by high-status actors, and they 
also have implications for how the internal process of  selecting projects might be struc-
tured differently to avoid products being put on to the market that may become major 
failures.
STATUS AND PROJECT PERFORMANCE
We theorize about the effects of  status in the context of  video game innovation projects. 
Innovation projects are inherently uncertain, meaning that their underlying quality and 
potential cannot be accurately assessed in advance (Baer, 2012; Sethi et al., 2012). Since 
several scholars have shown that the effects of  status are more pronounced in uncer-
tain environments (Collet and Philippe, 2014; Dimov et al., 2007; Podolny, 1994), status 
is expected to have important implications for the performance of  innovation projects 
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(Reitzig and Sorenson, 2013). A project is defined as performing well when there is a 
good product–market fit. In other words, the product is favorably received by the organi-
zation’s target external audience (Sethi et al., 2012). In the video game industry, project 
performance is captured by user ratings and review scores from critics, and this is consid-
ered to be mainly down to the project leader in this setting (Mollick, 2012).
We suggest that status is associated with increased project performance, because it 
helps project leaders to access resources and support. There are two reasons for this. First, 
since the work of  people with status is valued more highly than that of  people with little 
or no status (Azoulay et al., 2014; Kim and King, 2014), top decision-makers are more 
likely to provide such leaders with increased levels of  resources and support. Second, 
high-status actors also tend to have more valuable networks (Podolny and Phillips, 1996) 
and to receive more help from their network contacts (Brass and Burkhardt, 1993; Stuart 
et al., 1999). When implementing innovation projects, for instance, high-status project 
leaders are likely to have more relationships with key decision-makers, whose commit-
ment to the project should arguably help them to attract more resources and support 
from the whole organization compared to lower-status project leaders (Baer, 2012; Sethi 
et al., 2012). The notion that status helps project leaders to gain a high level of  resources 
and support from decision-makers and other network contacts is echoed by one of  our 
industry experts:
‘High-status producers are better able to get resources, attention, and support. […] 
Status is beneficial for getting the attention and opening doors’.
Project leaders with status can subsequently use these resources and support to improve 
their project’s performance (Ancona and Caldwell, 1992). Resources can be used, for 
instance, to hire a better workforce or acquire more advanced technologies. Thus, re-
sources and support should help project leaders to implement good projects that will 
perform well on the market.
However, too high a level of  status can also be detrimental, since more is expected of  
high-status actors in the workplace (e.g., Kim and King, 2014). High-status project lead-
ers are frequently called on to provide help and advice to others in their network. Indeed, 
low-status individuals will often attempt to create relationships with high-status individu-
als (Call et al., 2015). Given that high-status project leaders are in high demand and are 
interacting with many different people, they can easily experience information overload 
(Oldroyd and Morris, 2012), which can then prevent them from giving sufficient atten-
tion to their managerial role in the project. Importantly, this may reduce their ability to 
find a good product–market fit for their product, resulting in lower project performance. 
This is illustrated in a comment from one of  our industry experts:
‘I can certainly notice that as my status grows, my productivity goes down [...] [and] 
the threshold of  [my] “antennas” changes. I noticed that when people are not abso-
lutely clear, I start to miss the signals […] until somebody says something like, “I need 
help!”. In the past, I had more time for processing the information, but now, if  some-
body doesn’t scream then I don’t see the problem’.
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To summarize, we expect that status will have an inverted U-shaped relationship with 
project performance. That is, status opens up important opportunities for project lead-
ers to boost their project’s performance by accessing resources and support from their 
network to help with implementation. For these reasons, status should increase project 
performance, but only up to a certain point. Having too much status may become a lia-
bility, because of  its association with information overload, which reduces the likelihood 
of  creating a project that will perform well on the market. For leaders with very high sta-
tus, the greater information overload offsets the positive effects on project performance 
of  having more resources and a wider network. In other words, such leaders become 
less and less able to manage their resources and network effectively; having access to 
these types of  support, therefore, does not benefit them in terms of  project performance 
(Barney, 1995).
Hypothesis 1: There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between project leader status and proj-
ect performance.
STATUS AND PERFORMANCE EXTREMENESS
We argue next that where a project leader has high status, this can prevent their 
projects – good or bad – being terminated. Project leaders are typically assigned to the 
implementation of  project ideas by the top decision-makers and these ideas vary in terms 
of  quality (please see the Online Appendix for qualitative evidence). Just because a proj-
ect is considered to be high quality does not necessarily mean that it will be implemented. 
And even when a project leader is assigned to the implementation of  a high-quality idea, 
status can still be instrumental in the execution of  a project. Indeed, high-quality projects 
could fall victim to organizational resistance because they may pose a threat to the orga-
nization’s status quo (Frost and Egri, 1991). High-status leaders, however, should experi-
ence less resistance to their projects. This is because other people will be less critical of  a 
project when it is led by someone who has high status. Experiencing less resistance could 
help high-status leaders to have their projects selected and sustained. In fact, high-status 
leaders will have less need to justify the quality of  their project to others or to convince 
them of  the added value it will bring to the organization (Reitzig and Sorenson, 2013). 
Given their better network connections to decision-makers, they can interact with them 
more directly and can discuss and alleviate any skepticism they may have about the proj-
ect without needing to engage in organization-wide discussion about their project (Baer, 
2012; Fralich and Bitektine, 2020; Phillips et al., 2013; Podolny and Baron, 1997). While 
high-status leaders might experience information overload, we suggest that it is even 
more important that such leaders can avoid the possible termination of  their high-qual-
ity projects. In such a case, the resources and support that these leaders can organize can 
effectively be utilized by the project team to turn a high-quality idea into a great success.
That said, status may also be instrumental in preventing the termination of  low-qual-
ity projects. High-status actors benefit from an evaluation bias – the work they produce 
is valued more highly than those of  their low-status counterparts (Podolny, 2001). Since 
projects led by high-status leaders are given more credit irrespective of  the observable 
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quality (Azoulay et al., 2014; Kim and King, 2014), this bias may cause low-quality proj-
ects to be viewed as suitable for continuation, even though the quality is such that they 
would normally be terminated (Green et al., 2003). Hence, decision-makers may be less 
able to recognize when a project led by a high-status person is of  low quality, because 
their evaluation is biased by status signals. In other words, the evaluation bias results in a 
project being more likely to be accepted and continued inside an organization, regardless 
of  its quality, thus increasing the chances of  the organization undertaking low-quality 
projects that will perform poorly on the external market. Indeed, this negative conse-
quence of  project leader status is highlighted by one of  our industry experts:
‘I can think of  plenty of  examples of  projects that failed because of  the status of  the 
producer. Once we got an assignment from a renowned company [not specified to 
maintain anonymity]. I was completely convinced that the idea was a long way from 
what we should do, but there was this producer guy who sold the project to the own-
ers of  the company so well that they believed in him blindly, despite all the apparent 
signals. This guy was on our back for many, many years and burned many million 
dollars. […] We signaled the problems to the owner of  the company lots of  times, but 
it took almost two years before one of  the owners started to look into this. We could 
have created a very nice game, but we didn’t unfortunately’.
Thus, we suggest that status might lead to the implementation both of  extremely suc-
cessful projects and of  major failures, resulting in greater performance variation in the 
project portfolio of  high-status project leaders. In other words, project leader status is 
associated with a greater degree of  deviation – both positive and negative – from the 
quality of  innovation projects that might be expected statistically from project leaders 
(Sanders and Hambrick, 2007). Organizational support facilitates the implementation 
of  any project, regardless of  the risk involved; we would, therefore, expect high-status 
project leaders to exhibit more variation in performance than lower-status leaders, if  we 
control for the risk of  the project concerned, which is captured by project newness.
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between the project leader status and performance 




We tested our hypotheses in a new video game development context, because these proj-
ects involve a high level of  uncertainty (Aoyama and Izushi, 2003; Venkatraman and 
Lee, 2004), and status should thus have an observable effect in such a context (Podolny, 
1994). We collected data on projects from the online database MobyGames.com, which 
contains information about most of  the video games developed from 1972 onwards and 
allows us to construct relatively accurately the professional networks of  game developers 
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(Cattani and Ferriani, 2008). The database contains project performance data based on 
user ratings and review scores from industry critics. A valuable feature of  the dataset is 
that it allows us to use a standardized measurement of  project performance, enabling 
us to make reliable comparisons between performance scores for projects with different 
sizes of  development and advertising budget and to compare projects aimed at different 
market segments.
Our study focuses on the status of  the video game producer (Mollick, 2012). The 
producer function is a senior role undertaken by a person who takes full responsibility 
for managing the project as a business, including delivering a finished product on time 
(Irish, 2005). While the producers facilitate all decisions of  the product development 
team, their role also involves ensuring that their projects get the necessary resources and 
advocacy from the executive management. They do so by evangelizing the product in the 
organization and by eliminating all barriers to product development (Irish, 2005). Since 
top managers in game development and publishing companies typically make decisions 
on whether or not to go ahead with a project after interacting with the project producer 
(Irish, 2005), the producer has a direct influence on project implementation and contin-
uation decisions.
We decided to narrow down our selection to projects undertaken by a set of  successful 
companies that were either dominant throughout the whole observation period or were 
on the path to establishing dominance. We did this to test our theory in a conservative 
setting, because the effectiveness of  project-related decision-making in such successful 
companies was probably better than that of  most other organizations. In order to select 
these organizations, we used the database of  Euromonitor International, which has been 
monitoring the global video game market since 2008 (Euromonitor International, 2017). 
Using this database, we selected all the companies that were in the top 10 in terms of  
global market share in at least one of  the years between 2008 and 2012. Together, our 
selected companies consistently accounted for at least 60 per cent of  the global market 
during this period. Every additional company would increase that market share by less 
than a fraction of  a percent. We also considered selecting only projects from these com-
panies that were released after 2007, but this would have reduced our sample size to 45 
projects.
Using this sampling strategy, we initially had 12 companies. These organizations are 
considered the leading video game developer companies during the given time frame. 
However, three of  the companies were a result of  mergers between two separate organi-
zations. Therefore, we treated the two companies before the merger as separate entities 
and the post-merger company, which combined the experience and knowledge base of  
the two companies, as a third separate entity. In this way, we ended up with 18 compa-
nies. We found 4,741 projects (out of  7,771) for which there was information about the 
developer team. Using all the information from these 4,741 projects, we constructed 
separate longitudinal affiliation networks for each of  the 18 companies so that we could 
build a reliable picture of  the producers’ network position in their organizations.
An affiliation network is a network of  vertices connected by membership of  com-
mon groups such as projects, teams, or organizations (Cattani and Ferriani, 2008). 
Social network analysts have a long tradition of  analyzing affiliation networks such as 
co-authorships (McFadyen and Cannella, 2004) and collaborations between Broadway 
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artists (Uzzi and Spiro, 2005). Newman et al. (2002) argue that affiliation networks tend 
to be more reliable than friendship ties, for example, since group membership can be 
identified with greater precision. Following prior social network analysis research, we 
used a 3-year moving time window and converted our two-mode networks into one-
mode networks (Cattani and Ferriani, 2008; Uzzi and Spiro, 2005): That is, there was 
said to be a tie between two persons if  they had worked together to implement at least 
one project in the 3 years prior to a given year.
We subsequently selected all projects where we could identify the main producer and 
where this role could be clearly associated with one and only one person (1,842 projects). 
In one organization we did not find any such project, so we ended up with 17 companies. 
Given that the role of  producer has been widely adopted by video game companies only 
since the ‘90s, selecting projects with a single producer led to a sample of  more recent 
projects (from 1987 onwards), but their performance scores were not statistically different 
from these firms’ other projects. For an overview of  our sampling timeline, see the Online 
Appendix. Of  these 1,842 projects, we had full information for 745 (full information on 
their genres, novelty, target market, etc.). However, since we wanted to control for project 
leaders’ previous performance, we needed to exclude any projects that were a project 
leader’s first project, which led to a final sample size of  349 projects. Excluding previous 
performance as a control variable and testing our hypotheses on the 745 projects did not, 
however, lead to different results concerning the statistical significance and direction of  
relationships of  our main theoretical interest.
We now explain how we measured all our variables. First, we explain the measurement 
of  our independent and control variables, then the dependent variables, because we used 
all our independent and control variables to calculate one of  our dependent variables: 
performance extremeness.
Independent Variable
Status. We measure individuals’ status in their organization based on their network 
position in their organization; this is in line with Grigoriou and Rothaermel (2014), 
Hagedoorn and Duysters (2002), Kim and Rhee (2017), Rider (2009), Waguespack and 
Sorenson (2011), Aadland et al. (2019), and others (for other examples, see the review by 
Piazza and Castellucci, 2014, pp. 304–7). Network position is appropriate for capturing 
an individual’s status, because those who are the most central in the social network of  
an organization are typically those thought to be the most competent employees or 
star performers (Ibarra, 1993; Kehoe et al., 2016; Oettl, 2012; Oldroyd and Morris, 
2012). Indeed, Betancourt et al. (2018) showed that individuals ascribed the most status 
to members of  a social network who were the most central in three different types of  
network. In addition, our industry experts noted that they themselves used network 
centrality as a measure of  status, as one of  them explained:
‘Social networks are very important in this industry […] and they can be very valu-
able. […] For instance, if  I have a problem, I immediately have someone in mind to 
call. For example, I’ve an engine that is available to everyone, but I need a specific 
support plan […] I probably know a guy who can help me with that. So, these social 
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networks give you a lot of  work-around. If  I have a problem, I can call someone who 
will pull some strings and arrange that we get a sort of  custom solution in a price-effi-
cient manner. […] Also, I can ask things from others, like “please take a look at what I 
am doing. Your feedback matters a lot to me.” This is something that a young person 
without any social network cannot provide in the business’.
Thus, both previous research and our industry experts offer evidence for the fact that the 
position of  project leaders in the formal network shapes the beliefs of  other social actors 
about what most people think about their status worthiness and competence compared 
to other project leaders (Ridgeway and Correll, 2006).
We apply Bonacich’s centrality measure to our affiliation network matrices. Kim and 
Rhee (2017, p. 728) argue in a study conducted in the film industry that, with regard 
to film producers, the Bonacich network centrality score is one of  the most ‘important 
indicators of  filmmakers’ status in the film industry, reflecting prestige conferred by their 
peers’. Bonacich’s network centrality captures the size and quality of  project leaders’ 
affiliation networks. As such, network centrality of  an individual in our setting is a signal 
of  a producer’s competence. Indeed, individuals are assigned to projects when they are 
viewed by their collaborators and higher-ups as having the necessary skills to contribute 
to a project, especially compared to other organizational members who are assigned to 
fewer and less significant projects. Following previous research, we apply the following 
formula to compute the centrality score for each individual (Bonacich, 1987; Bothner 
et al., 2012; Podolny, 2005):
where Sikt denotes the status of  actor i, in firm k, at time t, where t is the release year of  
the game in question, and dijt denotes whether actors i and j have implemented a project 
together in the 3 years prior to time t (i.e., the year in which the game was published).[1] 
We dichotomized the values in our one-mode matrices to make sure we were capturing 
the real position of  individuals in their networks. Note that we looked at the whole net-
work in these companies, not just the ties between leaders. Since we were interested in an 
actor’s organizational status, we did not include ties that stemmed from an actor being 
involved in implementing a project in a completely different organization, without any 
collaboration with the organization in question before year t. Following Grigoriou and 
Rothaermel (2014), we measured status based on the relative centrality of  each individ-
ual compared to other individuals in an organization. Therefore, we chose the scaling 
vector α to normalize centrality scores so that they added up to 100 for each year in each 
firm; this enabled us to compare centrality scores across companies and years (Borgatti et 
al., 2003). We chose 100 for interpretive purposes. β is a parameter that denotes the trav-
eling distance of  communication in the network. Essentially, β serves as a length-based 
weight that can be adjusted when calculating the status score of  a given node in order to 
weight the status scores of  nodes that are farther from that node. In this study, β is set to 
three-quarters of  the inverse of  the highest normed eigenvalue of  the corresponding af-
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2005; Rider, 2009). Thus, the connectedness of  two nodes that are far away from each 
other in the network is relatively unimportant in determining their status scores, since 
their connectedness carries a low weighting in this calculation.
Control Variables
We control for eight project-level variables, four producer-level variables, and three firm-
level variables. For an overview of  our control variables, their measurement, and the 
rationale for using them, see Table I.
Dependent Variables
Project performance. In line with previous research, we measure performance as the 
extent to which a project fulfills its intended purpose. In the new product development 
literature, this typically means that there is a good product–market fit (e.g., Sethi et al., 
2012). In the video game industry this fit can be easily captured using user ratings and 
review scores from critics. Both of  these we were able to download from the website 
MobyGames.com, and enabled us to capture multiple aspects of  project performance at 
the same time. Products in creative industries typically need to fulfill a dual purpose to 
perform well on the market: they have to be both commercially successful and artistically 
sophisticated (Eikhof  and Haunschild, 2007). User reviews capture the former, since they 
reflect customer satisfaction, which is linked to purchase intentions. Previous research 
also shows that customer satisfaction is positively associated with market success. For 
instance, Rego et al. (2013) found a positive relationship between customer satisfaction 
and market share. Thus, user ratings can be regarded as a reliable measure of  project 
performance. Customer satisfaction is measured by the average of  the ratings from the 
website’s user community. Review scores from professional critics capture the extent to 
which the product design, graphics, and the technology it incorporates comply with the 
industry standards; they are, therefore, suitable for capturing technological and artistic 
sophistication. The critic review score is a combination of  reviews and rankings of  each 
game from professional critics from a number of  industry-specific online, television, and 
print media.
The scores for the critic reviews and user ratings were measured using different scales. 
The critic review scores ranged between 0 and 100, with 100 representing the most 
positive review, whereas user ratings were on a scale of  0 to 5, with 5 representing the 
highest rating. To capture these multiple facets, we standardized the two scores and took 
their average, following the approach used by Staw and Hoang (1995). We standardized 
these scores by multiplying the user rating scores by 20, and took the average of  both 
scores to get a combined project performance score. If  one of  the scores was missing 
(as happened 379 times for the critic review score and 163 times for the user ranking 
score out of  the 1,842 projects), we took the other score as the final performance score. 
Our measurement offers an adequate alternative to sales figures for two reasons. First, 
it makes product performance scores more comparable across time and organizations. 
Second, because there is an unsealed agreement between a game developer and a major 
game publisher company, one can argue that ratings on online websites are very import-
ant for the decision-makers in such organizations, and they pay great attention to these 
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Table I. Control variable descriptions
Control variable Measure Reason for inclusion
Project-level variables
Year of  release The year when the video game was 
released
Controlling for trends, techno-
logical changes, and changing 
user and critic perceptions 
over time
Project team size Count of  project participants Controlling for the amount of  
human capital and internal 
visibility of  the project
Newness-to-market To obtain these variables, we used 62 
category codes drawn from informa-
tion found on the MobyGames.com 
website. The category codes can take 
values of  0 or 1, with 1 meaning that 
the game fits into a certain category 
(e.g., action game, racing game, etc.). 
This resulted in a 62-digit code for 
each project that captured the prod-
uct’s main characteristics. Newness-to-
market is included in our models as a 
dummy variable, where 1 means that 
the combination of  category codes 
given to the project is completely new 
– i.e., there had been no similar game 
published between 1972 and the year 
in which the game in question was 
published (in time t)
Controlling for the risk and 
organizational resistance as-
sociated with a project (Sethi 
et al., 2012)
Newness-to-firm Calculated in a similar way to newness-
to-market, but the project’s category 
codes are compared only to those of  
other projects developed or published 
by the company in question before 
time t
Controlling for the risk and 
organizational resistance as-
sociated with a project (Sethi 
et al., 2012)
Licensed A dummy variable, with a value of  1 
signifying that the game is licensed. 
A licensed game is an adaptation of  
a movie (e.g., James Bond movies), a 
comic book (e.g. Superman), or a TV 
series (e.g., Star Trek)
Controlling for the amount of  
resources the team has access 
to and other organizational 
members’ perceptions of  the 
project
Externally developed A dummy variable, with a value of  1 
indicating that the publisher is not 
identical to the developer company
Externally developed projects 
might have a greater division 
of  labor in the development 
and publishing activities 
(Broekhuizen et al., 2013)
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Control variable Measure Reason for inclusion
Number of  reviews Number of  reviews Mobygames.com col-
lected from a wide variety of  profes-
sional review websites
Controlling for the marketing 
efforts of  the firm. Video game 
developers and publishers 
generally put conscious effort 
into contacting, and even try-
ing to influence, professional 
reviewers to write about their 
games (Nieborg and Sihvonen, 
2009). This process involves 
providing reviewers with a beta 
version of  their software so that 
they can write product reviews, 
often even before the official 
release of  the game (Ahmad et 
al., 2017)
Target group The target market is determined by the 
scores of  the Entertainment Software 
Rating Board (ESRB). The ESRB as-
signs age and content ratings for video 
games and specifies the appropriate 
target group for each video game: 
everyone, everyone10+, kids to adults 
(changed to ‘everyone’ after 1998), 
teen, and mature. We control for tar-
get market by including four dummy 
variables in our analyses with ‘every-
one’ being the reference category
Controlling for access to 
resources and the ability of  
the project leader to sell the 
project to top management
Producer-level variables
Parallel projects Number of  projects implemented by the 
project leader in question in a given 
year
Controlling for workload
Experience Number of  projects implemented in the 
past
Controlling for acquired project 
management skills
Network constraint We applied Burt’s constraint meas-
ure, which is given by the fol-













; i≠ j, where pij 
the proportion of  i’s network time and 
energy invested in actor j; the con-




Controlling for the producer’s 
ability to broker between peo-
ple (Burt, 2004)
Past performance Average of  performance scores for the 
project leader’s previous projects
Past performance might be an 
indicator of  individual com-
petencies that might be stable 
traits of  underlying individual 
performance (Groysberg and 
Lee, 2008)
Table I. Continued
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results when making decisions.[2] This was also echoed by our industry experts. We also 
considered using sales revenues as a possible alternative. (See the Online Appendix for 
further analyses.)
Performance extremeness. Following the steps taken by Sanders and Hambrick (2007), 
we operationalized performance extremeness as follows. We first regressed project 
performance on all our variables, including our main independent variables (status 
and status squared) to predict what project performance could be statistically expected 
from project leaders (χ2 = 57.56, p < 0.0001, conditional R2 = 0.36). We then took 
the absolute value of  the residuals of  this regression, because we were interested in the 
absolute deviation from expected performance, regardless of  its direction (Sanders and 
Hambrick, 2007).
Analysis
The hypothesized and methodological relationships are depicted in Figure 1. After ex-
cluding all observations with relevant missing data, we ended up with 349 projects, in-
volving 179 producers from 17 companies. The mean of  the performance scores of  
Control variable Measure Reason for inclusion
Firm-level variables
Firm innovativeness We aggregated the number of  projects 
that were new-to-market in a firm’s 
project portfolio in year t−1, t−2, and 
t−3, and divided this measure by the 
sum of  all firm projects implemented 
in the same time frame
Novel projects might face less 
resistance in firms which are 
more open to highly novel 
projects (Sethi et al., 2012)
Number of  firm projects Number of  the projects implemented by 
the firm in question in years t−1, t−2, 
and t−3
A large number of  implemented 
projects might indicate that 
there is relatively little resist-
ance to novel products within 
the firm and that it has a flex-
ible project review process
Firm network size Number of  individuals who participated 
in any project implemented by the 
firm in question in years t−1, t−2, and 
t−3
Since we rescaled the status 
scores so that they added up 
to 100 in each year in each 
firm, status may be seen as a 
function of  firm network size, 
because the larger the network, 
the more distributed status 
scores become. Also, firm 
network size is an indication of  
the firm’s access to resources
Table I. Continued
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excluded observations did not differ significantly from that of  our final sample (t = 0.62, 
p > 0.10). Since there might be within-cluster dependence among the observations, we 
built a linear mixed-effects model in which we included the project leaders as a level-2 
and the companies as a level-3 random effect.
RESULTS
Preliminary Analysis
Before our main analysis, we conducted some preliminary analysis, looking for patterns 
in the raw data that would support our theoretical intuitions presented above. First, look-
ing at Table II and comparing project leaders with a status score below 0.5, between 0.5 
and 1.5, and above 1.5, we can observe that the relationship between status and project 
performance does not seem to be linear, but shows an inverted ‘U-shaped’ pattern, with 
project leaders with a medium level of  status leading more above-average performance 
projects than either low- or high-status leaders. In order to visualize the relationship 
Figure 1. Our theoretical and methodological relationships
Table II. The status of  project leaders and the percentage of  projects below and above average performance
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between status and project performance, we fitted a polynomial regression line using the 
LOESS method (see Figures 2A and 2B) (Cleveland et al., 1992). The shape of  the curve 
indicates that the relationship between status and performance was curvilinear.
In order to investigate whether high-status project leaders exhibit more extreme per-
formance, we created a dummy variable indicating whether the project exhibited ex-
treme performance compared to the industry average, i.e., was either above or below the 
mean performance score by plus or minus at least one standard deviation. We then calcu-
lated the proportion of  projects with extreme performance for leaders with a status score 
of  below or above 1.0 (indicating low- and high-status project leaders, respectively), and 
reported our results in Table III. It shows that, as status increases, the number of  projects 
that tend to deviate from the industry average in any direction also increases, indicating 
that status leads to more extreme performance, in both positive and negative directions.
Finally, we were interested in finding empirical evidence for our claims concerning our 
theoretical mechanisms. One of  our central arguments was that high-status project lead-
ers have better access to organizational support and resources. Although we did not have 
Figure 2. (A) A scatterplot and a polynomial regression line depicting the relationship between status and 
project performance for every project where we could clearly identify a project leader. (B) A scatterplot and 
a polynomial regression line depicting the relationship between status and project performance in the range 
of  status scores in our sample
Range of status 














Mean performance score 
Observations with outlier status 















Table III. The status of  project leaders and descriptive data of  their project portfolio
Status < 1.0 Status > 1.0
Absolute deviation from the industry average < one standard deviation 80.3% 71.0%
Absolute deviation from the industry average > one standard deviation 19.7% 29.0%
Below average number of  reviews/Project team size 73.7% 42.8%
Above average number of  reviews/Project team size 26.3% 57.2%
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any data on each project’s development budget, we could use the number of  reviews for 
each video game on online professional outlets as a proxy for marketing budget, since 
the number of  reviews a video game receives in media outlets is determined by the mar-
keting efforts of  the firm (Ahmad et al., 2017; Gemser et al., 2007), as was suggested by 
our industry experts. We divided the number of  reviews for each video game on online 
professional outlets by the size of  the project team (i.e., the number of  team members), 
and calculated the proportion of  projects with above and below average number of  
reviews per project team member (see Table III). As can be seen, there was a positive 
relationship between status and the number of  reviews per team member, providing 
tentative evidence to support our thesis that high-status project leaders receive more 
organizational support and have better access to resources. We now report our results of  
our main analysis.
Main Analysis
Table IV presents the descriptive statistics as well as bivariate correlations, and Table V 
contains our statistical analyses of  how a project leader’s status affects project perfor-
mance. Hypothesis 1 predicted there would be an inverted U-shaped relationship be-
tween status and project performance. To determine whether this is so and to assess the 
significance of  that relationship, we apply a three-step procedure proposed by Lind and 
Mehlum (2010). First, we find that the coefficient of  the linear term of  status is positive 
(β = 17.20, p < 0.05) and that of  the squared term of  status is statistically significant and 
negative (β = −9.25, p < 0.05). Second, the slope needs to be significantly steep at both 
ends of  the data range (Lind and Mehlum, 2010). We do indeed find that the slope of  the 
effect of  status on project performance is positive and significant with low levels of  status, 
and negative and significant with high levels of  status. Third, we find that the estimated 
extreme point of  this relationship (0.96) and its 95 per cent confidence interval, calcu-
lated based on Fieller’s standard error method (0.54; 1.68), are located within the data 
range (Lind and Mehlum, 2010). Thus, our results show support for Hypothesis 1. Status 
is associated with higher project performance only up to a certain point. The negative 
coefficient of  the squared term of  project leader status implies that project leaders with 
very high status may often fail to outperform their middle-status counterparts.
We also find support for Hypothesis 2, which predicted a positive linear association be-
tween status and absolute deviation from the expected performance (β = 3.14, p < 0.05) 
(see Table V). Hence, we may conclude that the positive relationship between status and 
performance extremeness is statistically significant. That is, the status of  project leaders 
increases the absolute deviation from the expected performance level of  their project in 
both directions. More specifically, when a project leader’s status score increases by one 
point, their project performance scores tend to deviate from the expected level of  perfor-
mance by 3.14 points in either direction (i.e., upward or downward).
In order to facilitate interpretation of  the effect size, we plotted the effect of  status on 
project performance in Figure 3 and the effect of  status on performance extremeness 
in Figure 4 with a 95 per cent confidence interval. It can be seen that project leaders 
with moderate levels of  status implement the projects that are deemed to perform best; 
their projects tend to be evaluated about eight points higher than projects undertaken by 
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low-status project leaders. Furthermore, the projects undertaken by high-status leaders 
tend to receive scores that are similar to the average scores for lower-status leaders.
This difference between the project performance scores of  middle-status project lead-
ers and those with higher or lower status seems to indicate that status can make a dif-
ference, as the difference of  eight points is close to the standard deviation of  project 
performance scores in our sample (10.84). Thus, the effect of  status on project perfor-
mance is substantial (Hypothesis 1). Also, despite the project performance scores being 
on average eight points lower for high-status project leaders, the variation in their per-
formance scores nevertheless means that in some cases they attain the same average 
Table V. Estimates for mixed-effects models of  project performance and performance extremeness
Variables
Project performance Performance extremeness
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 227.73 (418.16) −42.40 (470.18) 114.41 (204.65) −80.38 (225.13)
Year of  release −0.09 (0.21) 0.05 (0.23) −0.05 (0.10) 0.05 (0.11)
Project team size 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00)
Newness-to-market −0.87 (1.27) −1.19 (1.27) 0.87 (0.65) 0.87 (0.64)
Newness-to-firm −1.61 (2.00) −1.77 (1.98) 1.04 (0.97) 0.94 (0.98)
Licensed −4.08 (1.46)** −3.78 (1.45)** 1.14 (0.72) 1.30 (0.72)
External development −3.32 (1.98) −3.34 (1.96) 2.32 (0.96)* 2.29 (0.97)*
Number of  reviews 0.08 (0.02)*** 0.08 (0.02)*** −0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01)
Target group controls Included Included Included Included
Parallel projects −0.01 (0.60) −0.16 (0.60) 0.24 (0.30) 0.26 (0.30)
Experience 0.06 (0.13) −0.08 (0.14) −0.07 (0.06) −0.08 (0.06)
Network constraint −2.93 (24.39) 8.67 (25.10) −10.37 (12.24) −6.33 (12.34)
Past performance 0.25 (0.06)*** 0.25 (0.06)*** −0.12 (0.03)*** −0.12 (0.03)***
Firm innovativeness 11.20 (9.19) 6.89 (9.28) −6.06 (4.52) −5.59 (4.53)
Number of  firm projects −0.02 (0.02) −0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
Firm network size 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00)
Status 17.20 (8.07)* 3.14 (1.58)*
Status × Status −9.25 (3.89)*
Log likelihood −1280.10 −1277.29 −1040.45 −1038.51
Number of  observations 349 349 349 349
Number of  project leaders 179 179 179 179
Number of  firm IDs 17 17 17 17
Variance: Project leaders 18.70 17.49 2.56 2.99
Variance: Firm IDs 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Residual 74.97 74.38 20.55 19.97
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; all tests are two-tailed;
*, **, and *** denote significance levels of  5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively.
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performance scores as the middle-status project leaders. The expected deviation increases 
by βstatus (3.14) with each status score. Thus, high-status project leaders tend to exhibit 2 × 
βstatus (2 × 3.14 = 6.28) scores that deviate more in either direction compared to their 
low-status counterparts. While, on the one hand this allows them in some cases to achieve 
similar performance scores to their high-performing but middle-status counterparts, on 
the other hand it also leads to low-performing projects being undertaken, projects whose 
performance scores are about 6.28 points lower than those of  low-status project lead-
ers. Hence, we suggest that, in terms of  how status affects performance extremeness 
(Hypothesis 2), the size of  the effect is very important, both theoretically and practically.
Robustness Analyses
We ran a number of  post-hoc analyses to substantiate our findings (see the Online 
Appendix for an overview of  the robustness analyses) and we report here the results of  
the most important of  these (see the Online Appendix for additional robustness analy-
ses concerning endogeneity, alternative explanations, our theoretical framing and the-
oretical mechanisms, and alternative measures of  our dependent variables). Our first 
and most important concern was endogeneity. To investigate this issue, we checked our 
Figure 3. The effect of  status on project performance (Hypothesis 1). Note: The gray area represents the 95% 
confidence interval around the regression line.
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results, controlling for possible sources of  selection bias by applying Heckman’s (1979) 
two-stage selection procedure. First, we checked whether our results were affected by any 
selection bias caused by our sampling strategy. To control for this, we first predicted the 
probability that a project would be included in our final sample based on all available in-
formation on all the project characteristics in our whole dataset (using a sample of  7,285 
projects). We then calculated the Inverse Mills ratio for this regression and included it in 
our regressions predicting project performance and performance extremeness. This did 
not substantially change our results in terms of  the statistical significance of  the relation-
ships of  main interest.
To check for other possible sources of  endogeneity, we re-examined our results using 
an instrumental variable: career tenure. Career tenure is an exogenous variable that is re-
garded as an important source of  status as a quality signal, since it signals experience and 
expertise to others, both of  which enhances and supports the higher status of  an indi-
vidual (Pearce and Xu, 2012). Hence, we calculated the number of  years project leaders 
had worked in the industry. First, we looked at whether career tenure is positively related 
to status, and we did find a positive relationship between career tenure and status, which 
was significant at the 10 per cent level (p = 0.07). We then predicted the status of  proj-
ect leaders based on their career tenure and used these values as the main independent 
Figure 4. The effect of  status on performance extremeness (Hypothesis 2). Note: The gray area represents the 
95% confidence interval around the regression line.
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variable in our regressions predicting project performance and performance extreme-
ness. Using these values, we found additional support for Hypothesis 2 (p = 0.02) and 
marginal support for Hypothesis 1, since the curvilinear relationship between status and 
performance was significant only at the 10 per cent significance level (p = 0.05).
DISCUSSION
In this study we explored the performance effects of  status in innovation projects, a 
context in which status shapes the expectations for project leaders. We showed that there 
is a curvilinear relationship between project leader status and innovation project perfor-
mance and a positive association between status and absolute deviation from expected 
performance, which means that high-status project leaders tend to fail to meet these 
expectations.
Theoretical Implications
We believe that our study makes several important contributions to management theory. 
First, we provide insights that will be valuable for theory on status. Reitzig and Sorenson 
(2013) showed that managers might be positively biased toward strategic initiatives devel-
oped by high-status business units. We extend these insights by showing how the biasing 
effect of  status affects project performance. Most importantly, we show that, on the one 
hand, a high status of  project leaders can lead to exceptional performance, which we 
explain with reference to a perceptual bias leading to high resource provision and sup-
port for high-quality projects being selected and implemented. On the other hand, we 
show that high status amplifies the risk of  significant failures. We suggest that this is the 
case because other actors in the network of  a high-status project leader find it difficult 
to assess accurately the quality of  this leader’s projects (Kim and King, 2014). While 
it is generally assumed in status theory that perceptional bias increases the subsequent 
performance of  high-status individuals (Kim and King, 2014; Merton, 1968; Sauder 
et al., 2012), we find evidence to suggest this might not always be the case. Since other 
people around a high-status leader seldom take into account the possibility of  failure 
when evaluating his or her projects, there is a greater likelihood that they will continue 
to support those projects. The exceedlingly high expectations associated with status may 
also lead co-workers and other project managers to overload high-status leaders with 
responsibilities and information that, in the end, weakens their ability to deliver on those 
expectations. Thus, our study provides additional evidence that the high expectations 
associated with the Matthew effect has potential negative performance consequences 
(King and Carberry, 2018).
Our findings also relate to the literature on middle-status conformity. This theory sug-
gests that middle-status actors tend to deviate less from conventional practice than either 
low- or high-status actors. High-status actors can feel entitled to deviate without being 
subject to penalties, while low-status actors feel that they do not have any status to lose as 
a consequence of  deviating (Perretti and Negro, 2006; Phillips and Zuckerman, 2001). 
Recently however, status scholars started to question this assumption and explored the 
conditions in which the theory of  middle-status conformity applies (Durand and Kremp, 
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2016; Fralich and Bitektine, 2020; Kovács and Liu, 2016; Prato et al., 2019). The proj-
ect leaders we focused on in our study were not at the top of  the formal organizational 
hierarchy (i.e., not top managers). The status of  these leaders not only determines their 
own behavior, as is suggested by the literature on middle-status conformity, but also the 
extent to which they are given scope by their supervisors and other decision-makers in their 
organization to realize their innovation projects. We argue that this scope is important 
in a context like ours, because the risk-taking behavior of  high-status project leaders is 
insufficient to explain project performance. For instance, low-status managers might be 
willing to make highly risky decisions regarding their projects but this is unlikely to be-
come evident if  these leaders have no autonomy to act upon them. Thus, it is important 
for future studies to take into account the environment in which individual leaders work, 
and specifically how far they are allowed to behave autonomously.
Managerial Implications
Our findings offer important insights for practice. Managers can follow two approaches 
in dealing with project leader status. The first is to accept the effects of  status on per-
formance as shown in this paper. Managers can leverage the assumed evaluation bias 
in project evaluations, for instance, by selecting low- or middle-status project leaders 
based on the particular resource needs of  the project. More specifically, they could assign 
low-status project leaders to projects with low resource needs, and middle-status project 
leaders to projects with high resource needs. This will maximize project performance and 
minimize the chance of  major failures that would do serious damage to the organiza-
tion’s profits (Van Oorschot et al., 2013). Another approach, which can be used particu-
larly with high-status project leaders, is to implement various measures in order to reduce 
the negative biasing effect of  status in the decision-making process, particularly when an 
organizational ‘star’ (i.e., high-status leader) is in charge of  a project. One way of  doing 
this might be to increase the formalization of  the review process and reduce its flexibility. 
Furthermore, top performers are very often celebrated within organizations and become 
very high-profile, with their status increasing accordingly (Oldroyd and Morris, 2012). 
Our study reveals that, especially when an individual has acquired very high status, this 
might not always be beneficial, as it can have implications for the performance of  his or 
her projects. We suggest that high-status project leaders often suffer from information 
overload. To that end, managers should try not to bombard project leaders with infor-
mation. Information overload can be mitigated by allocating information gatekeepers to 
high-status individuals who control the information flow between these individuals and 
the rest of  the organization (Oldroyd and Morris, 2012).
Limitations and Direction for Future Research
Like all research, the present work is not without its limitations. However, these limita-
tions may also spur future research. The most important limitation of  our study is that 
we had insufficient information on precisely how and when status might be affecting 
project selection and continuation decisions. Future research could examine the deci-
sion-making process in greater detail to assess what positive and negative effects status 
may have at different points in the process. It is possible that the main reason why higher 
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status is associated with greater variation in performance is because high-status project 
leaders are already influencing the selection process at the front end of  the product devel-
opment process (Reitzig and Sorenson, 2013) – through framing, for instance (Kaplan, 
2008; Sethi et al., 2012). It could also be the case that the status of  a leader may make 
that leader more committed to the project during the development phase, and more de-
termined to keep the project alive by exerting influence and mobilizing support in order 
to ‘save face’ (Guler, 2007) until such point that he or she can blame any lack of  per-
formance on external factors such as market conditions. Future research that addresses 
this issue could increase our understanding of  how status affects the implementation of  
innovations. Another important limitation of  our study is that we did not have informa-
tion on projects that were not implemented, a common limitation in studies that seek to 
analyze affiliation networks (Cattani and Ferriani, 2008; McFadyen and Cannella, 2004; 
Waguespack and Sorenson, 2011). This may raise two concerns that open up new ave-
nues for future research. First, one could argue that affiliation networks do not perfectly 
reflect the actual social networks in the organizations analyzed in this study. Second, our 
data offered us no opportunity to investigate how canceled projects affect the status of  
project leaders. Even though these are relevant concerns, we believe that they are less 
applicable to status studies. The main focus of  such studies is not to analyse the commu-
nication or information flow in the network but to understand better how individuals’ 
status and their ability to provide high-quality work is perceived. Based on our interviews 
with industry experts, we believe that, in our particular context, status is driven more 
by the interactions people had on projects that were implemented and not so much by 
their interactions on those that were not. It would be very beneficial, however, for future 
studies to investigate how failure and project cancelation affect project leader status. For 
instance, although it is likely that failed projects reduce the status of  project leaders, it is 
possible that leaders with very high status are more effective at protecting their position 
than other leaders. It would also be very valuable to investigate further the relationship 
between affiliation and real-life social networks, for example, by testing the assumption 
that affiliation networks may serve as a reliable proxy for real-life social networks (Cattani 
and Ferriani, 2008). Moreover, since we did not have any information on project dura-
tion, we could not capture other facets of  project leader and project performance, such 
as completion time. Future studies could generate valuable insights into the relationship 
between project leader status and project completion. Finally, we did not have accurate 
information on the size of  each project’s development budget. It would be valuable for 
future research to explore what kind of  resources status primarily attracts in development 
projects.
CONCLUSION
The objective of  this paper was to contribute to status research by showing that the ex-
pectations others create for high-status project leaders in fact inhibit project leaders from 
meeting these expectations paradoxically. Whereas, according to previous research sup-
porting the Matthew effect, status leads to better access to organizational resources and 
opportunities, our study marks an important step in this ongoing conversation revealing 
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that the Matthew effect can actually have negative consequences. This is because high 
expectations coming from status also create cognitive overload and overly positive eval-
uations resulting in major failures which potentially may even put the survival of  some 
organizations at risk. We hope our paper will guide future research how to overcome the 
negative side effects of  status.
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NOTES
[1] We also considered reconstructing the social hierarchy by calculating which project leaders outperform 
other project leaders, following Bothner et al. (2012). In our context this would be inappropriate, how-
ever, since the fact that a project leader outperforms another can be attributed to many different factors. 
This is not the case in the racing and athletic contests studied by Bothner et al. (2012). Despite the fact 
that one project leader performs better than another, those within their own organization may still hold 
the second individual in higher regard, because he or she may have penetrated a new market for the 
firm, for instance. Hence, as Waguespack and Sorenson (2011) did when investigating the film industry, 
we measure status based on undirected project affiliation relationships. However, following Kim and 
Rhee’s (2017) analysis of  film producers’ networks, we use Bonacich’s power centrality rather than 
degree centrality in undirected affiliation networks to measure the status of  project leaders, because it is 
not simply the number of  relationships that matters but also the centrality of  those with whom an indi-
vidual has worked. As such, project leaders that are allocated to small, and thus relatively insignificant, 
projects typically have lower status scores than those who are allocated to larger and, therefore, more 
significant projects.
[2] Activision-Bungie contract. This document was ordered to be unsealed by the Los Angeles Superior 
Court and provides the public with in-depth details of  an agreement between a game developer and 
a major game publisher. Retrieved from http://docum ents.latim es.com/bungi e-activ ision -contract on 
10 July 2017.
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